Image 1. HMA field personnel
set up a baseline TIR field
test site in the Iraqi desert to
learn about how the natural
environment and local weather
conditions affect sensing of
buried targets.

All graphics courtesy of the authors.
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How TIR Imaging Can Locate Buried
Cluster Munitions in the Iraqi Desert
By John Fardoulis [ Mobility Robotics ], Xavier Depreytere [ Humanity & Inclusion ],
Jonathon Guthrie [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]

I

n this article, we follow on from our previous work published in The Journal of Conventional
Weapons Destruction that proved how buried thirty-year-old legacy anti-personnel and anti-tank
landmines could be located using thermal infrared (TIR) sensors in the Sahara Desert, northern
Chad.¹ This time, the emphasis is on proving how the location of buried submunitions from cluster
munition strikes in the desert of southern Iraq can be identified using TIR sensors.
Work took place as part of the Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International, HI) Odyssey
2025 Project, partnering with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and Mobility Robotics.

HMA Scope
Explosive hazards exist in large parts of southern Iraq from cluster munition strikes that took place during the Gulf War.2,3 Thirty
years later, areas are still littered with unexploded submunitions,
which cause casualties throughout the region, and it could take
decades to clear contamination using current practices. To address
this problem, we are evaluating the potential from new technology
and methods to accelerate the land release process, make operations safer, and save costs.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the baseline TIR field
study in October and November 2021 was the first to capture realworld data from a civilian TIR sensor in a legacy cluster strike location in the desert.
The scope of work was clear:
1. Could a TIR sensor capture thermal anomalies emitted
from buried submunitions found in the Iraqi desert? If not,
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that would be a break point in terms of applied, real-world
research.
2. If 1. was possible, when do thermal anomalies from buried submunitions appear? The approach was empirical—observation
based, not theoretical.
The concept is to work on a progressive, evidence-based
model, achieving each milestone before moving to the next step.
Anomalies in this article represent surface temperature anomalies above buried targets as captured by a TIR camera. Noticing
any weather or other trends that affect when anomalies appear is
a bonus. Separating the degree of influence that each of the many
complex variables has on making thermal anomalies appear or
forecasting potential efficiency gains if such a sensor was deployed
in routine operations is beyond the scope of an initial baseline sensor field trial.
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Figure 1. The baseline TIR field test site was located adjacent to where cluster munition
clearance was concurrently underway, in a province with relatively widespread cluster
munition contamination.
For now, we are concentrating on when anomalies from buried
targets are visible to the TIR camera—parking most of the complex
science behind what makes the anomalies appear to the sensor for
later and adopting a black box philosophy regarding why such phenomena takes place.
An important reason to translate complex science into a simplified observation-based methodology is to encourage other
HMA actors to also capture baseline TIR sensor data regarding
each type of explosive hazards found in arid and perhaps semiarid locations where they work. The same methodology that we
have used for cluster munitions can also be used to determine if
sensors can capture TIR anomalies from buried landmines, buried improvised explosive devices, or buried explosive remnants of
war. This article endeavors to not only present findings but to also
share information about the process so that other HMA actors can
replicate such methodologies.

The reason for observing when TIR anomalies appear is for
insight regarding when such a sensor may be used operationally
in the future. A current way to remotely capture survey data in
suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas
(CHAs) without people having to enter the hazard area is by flying cameras on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—also known as
small drones. Flying TIR sensors on UAVs to locate buried contamination would be the long-term goal, if they prove viable in the
real-world. Currently UAVs are mostly used in HMA to capture
daylight imagery, looking for direct evidence and/or ground-sign
indicators.4 Going beyond what is visible on the surface has led to
our field trials in post-conflict locations to capture real-world evidence as part of a process in determining how practical and effective TIR sensors can be in dealing with buried targets in the desert.

Hypothesis
Buried submunitions interfere with how thermal energy is
stored in and travels through the ground, creating hot or cold
patches on the surface above buried objects. The different surface
temperature above the buried target is an anomaly, an indicator

that contamination may exist beneath. The strength and timing of
when a hot or cold patch appears during the day or night depends
on many complex factors such as the target’s physical properties as
well as weather and environmental variables at the time.1,5–9
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Materials & Methods
We recorded high temporal and spatial resolution thermal
anomaly data from targets buried to known depths by a TIR camera mounted at a fixed height to assess sensor capabilities in identifying the presence of sub-surface submunitions. The automated

baseline TIR field test site continuously captured data at oneminute intervals over twenty-four-hour daily (diurnal) cycles during an autumn season.

Ground Composition
This article focuses on the performance of a TIR sensor in
capturing temperature anomalies from buried targets in sandy
ground. A second study also took place during the same field
mission with targets buried in hard, compacted ground found
at a second cluster munition clearance site approximately 10 km
away. While important to keep track of the soil type as a relevant

variable, many other complex variables are also at play, and it is too
early to make predictions based on one variable alone with results
from one location. However, soil samples were collected for future
analysis, as was the case during our baseline TIR field study in the
Sahara Desert, Chad.

Targets
Targets were thirty-year-old legacy,11 weathered, steel production submunitions recovered from the surrounding region. The
relatively thick, metal inner section of BLU-97 submunitions (not
the outer casing, spider, or parachute) were used for buried targets

M77

BLU-61

of that model because that is what was available, and it is the heavy
section that does not move in the desert. Targets were free from
explosives (FFE), which may exhibit a difference in TIR responses
to legacy, buried targets containing explosive fills.

BLU-97

BLU-63

Figure 2. Some of the weathered, legacy submunition targets buried in the baseline TIR
study. They are shown approximately to scale.
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Baseline TIR Field Site
The baseline TIR field test site was established in the vicinity of
Al-Bussayah village, Muthanna, Iraq. The baseline site was set up
on land previously contaminated by cluster munitions but cleared,
approximately 300 m from an active cluster munition clearance site.
A grid of thirty-five 30 x 30 cm boxes was established at the baseline field test site, with the TIR camera covering that footprint from

Equipment and Software

a 4 m height. Targets were buried in the hard ground three weeks
prior to the study, giving them time to settle. Based on past experience with coarse sand in the Sahara Desert, Chad, we buried targets
one day prior in soft stand. A hole was dug and refilled in one cell as
a control for each ground type, and a large stone was placed on the
surface in a cell as a control during the hard ground study.

Weather station sensors

Commercially available equipment and sensors were utilized. Mounted on a 4.5 m high mast
(Figure 3), a FLIR Duo Pro R TIR camera with a
13 mm lens11 captured images every minute.
A consumer-grade weather station,12 with sensors mounted on the mast above the TIR camera,
recorded meteorological data. The power source
was a 200 Ah truck battery, which was swapped
out every five days. FLIR Tools13 and Microsoft
Excel14 were used for data presentation.

TIR camera
Video transmitter

Results

Weather station
data logger

Temperature anomalies emitted from submunitions captured by the TIR camera could identify
the position of buried targets in the Iraqi desert
not visible to the naked eye.

Characterizing TIR
Anomalies

Truck battery

Buried targets

Figure 3. The baseline TIR field test site set up, from which

This paper presents TIR anomalies from burresearchers logged thermal anomalies from buried targets
ied targets in two ways. First, we show copies of
in the Iraqi desert.
thermal images directly from the TIR camera’s
memory card for either the whole grid area, such as in Figure 6 and the y-axis in Figure 5. The shape of each line in the graphs also
Figure 7, or by cropping the data to focus on individual targets. The provides an idea about the rate of change in temperature, which
second way that anomalies are visualized is by showing a surface can affect how obvious an anomaly appears—i.e., the anomalies
temperature slice as a graph of the cross-sectional profile of tem- appear duller from deeper depths, as shown in Figure 4, where
perature change (driving force) caused by the TIR anomaly—e.g., cells (ii) and (iv) are duller than (i) and (iii), which corresponds with
in Figure 4 and explained in more detail in Figure 5. The position lines in Figure 5. Examples of thirteen different thermal anomaof where the temperature slice was taken is indicated by a blue line lies from buried targets captured by the TIR camera at night are
across the anomaly in the associated TIR image.
shown in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows thermal anomalies from the
The intensity of each anomaly is greater for shallower tar- same thirteen buried targets during the day, with Table 2 listing
gets, indicated by the strength of the driving force as shown on the depth of each target.

Day Versus Night
Temperature anomalies from buried metal submunitions used
in these trials appeared cooler than the surrounding surface during the day, and appeared hotter than the surrounding surface
during the night.
While visible for most of the night, anomalies from buried submunitions were evident during the day but only for a

limited number of hours. In some cases, the amount of anomaly thermal contrast was better at deeper depths during the day.
For example, the anomaly from the BLU-97 buried at 2.7 cm is
more evident during the day than the night (Figure 4 [iv] vs [ii] ,
and Figure 5 [iv] vs [ii] ).
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(i)
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(iii)

(iv)

Driving Force (Degrees Celsius)

Figure 4. Zooming in on examples of day and night anomalies from buried BLU-97 captured by the TIR camera from Figure 6 and
Figure 7. BLU-97 submunitions. Figure 4(i) and (ii) are from 0.7 cm and 2.7 cm depths at night; (iii) and (iv) are from 0.7 cm and 2.7
cm during the day. Weather information is available in Table 1.
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Figure 5. Left is an example of a graph created by exporting
temperature values from each pixel in the TIR image to
Microsoft Excel to present a surface slice section from off
the side of the anomaly along a slice that goes through the
anomaly (e.g., blue lines in Figure 4), showing a cross section
of change in temperature emitted by the buried target. Each
graph shows the differences in temperature from across the
anomaly profile, subtracted from the surrounding bulk (plain)
surface temperature to calculate the driving force (anomaly
temperature minus bulk temperature) associated with each
anomaly. Thin lines from where values have been exported
are visible in each TIR image to show where the values for
each graph have been taken.
The graph above shows TIR anomalies from Figure 4 for
night and day anomalies from BLU-97 submunitions. Figure
5(i) and (ii) are from 0.7 cm and 2.7 cm depths at night; (iii) and
(iv) are from 0.7 cm and 2.7 cm during the day.

Day/Night Time

Air Temperature

Wind Gust (km/hr)

Solar Radiation (W/m2)

Humidity

Night 3: 19:30

27.9°C

5.8

0

20%

Day 2: 13:30

34.7°C

9.7

367

18%

Table 1. Night/Day Weather Conditions for data in Figure 6 and Figure 7.
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Figure 6. TIR anomalies from targets at a favourable time during the night. This TIR image was taken on Night 3 at 19:30. It
provides a good snapshot of thermal anomaly characterization for thirteen targets. Details regarding the burial depth of each
item is provided in Table 2. Dark is cool, light is warm.

Figure 7. TIR anomalies from targets at a favourable time during the day. This TIR image was taken on Day 1 at 13:30 for a good
comparison against the same thirteen targets and depths as in Figure 6 above. Dark is cool, light is warm.

Ref.

Target

Depth

(a)

PTAB-M

0.5 cm

(b)

M42

(c)

Ref.

Target

Depth

(f)

M77

1.0 cm

1.0 cm

(g)

BLU-61

M42

1.5 cm

(h)

(d)

BLU-63

1.0 cm

(e)

BLU-63

0.5 cm

Ref.

Target

Depth

(k)

BLU-97

0.7 cm

0.7 cm

(l)

BLU-97

2.7 cm

BLU-61

2.8 cm

(m)

PTAB-2.5KO

0.5 cm

(i)

BLU-97

2.0 cm

(j)

BLU-97

1.3 cm

Table 2. Target burial depths.
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Best Times to Operate
After selecting a large and small submunition as reference targets
to summarize when anomalies were visible, we reviewed 360 TIR
anomalies at thirty-minute intervals over four nights and three-anda-half days. A BLU-97 buried at a depth of 2.0 cm, which also acted
as a proxy for the two BLU-97 targets at shallower depths of 0.7 cm
and 1.3 cm was the large submunition reference target; a M77 buried
at 1.0 cm was the small submunition reference target. The visibility of
anomalies from reference targets in TIR images were ranked visually,
each assigned a category by a trained eye using a simple data review
method suited to a long-term goal of building capacity for future
studies to be led from in the field. The three categories are: visible
to the TIR camera (shown in Tables 3–6, 8, and 9 as green), weak
(orange), and not visible (red).
More advanced graphs showing anomaly surface temperature gradients are presented in this article as a training aid, but a long-term
goal is to democratize the use of baseline field test sites and not overwhelm HMA field personnel with burdens regarding data analysis.

The most important outcome is for trained personnel to note when
anomalies are clearly visible (the green category), which provides
insight into when to operate in the future. Tracking times when
anomalies are weak could be optional, leaving times when they are
not visible blank. This concept of simplified TIR anomaly interpretation was first prototyped with indigenous HMA field staff in Chad.
Table 3 shows that a TIR anomaly from the BLU-97 reference target
was consistently visible during the night, apart from being weak for a
few hours on the first and second nights, and towards the end of the
fourth night.
Table 4 shows that a TIR anomaly from the BLU-97 reference target
was visible for up to four hours during the day from late morning,
apart from the morning of the fourth day when it was windy.
Table 5 shows that a TIR anomaly from the M77 reference target
can be seen for most of the time during some nights, but visibility was
patchy on the first two nights and towards the end of the night during
the last two nights.
0630

0600

0530

0500

0430

0400

0330

0300

0230
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0000

2330
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1900
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Night

(a)

1
2

(b)

3

(d)

→

4

(e)

→

(c)

Table 3. TIR Anomaly Visibility BLU-97 2.0 cm Depth, Night.
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1300
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1200

1130

1100

1030

1000

0930

0900

0830

0800

0730

0700

Day
1
2
3
4

Table 4. TIR Anomaly Visibility BLU-97 2.0 cm Depth, Day.
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Table 5. TIR Anomaly Visibility M77 1.0 cm Depth, Night.
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1
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4

Table 6. TIR Anomaly Visibility M77 1.0 cm Depth, Day.
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Visible

Weak

Not Visible

Table 6 shows that a TIR anomaly from the M77 reference target
can be seen at around the middle of the day, but visibility can be
patchy. The amount of time that anomalies from the M77 reference
target were visible during the day was considerably less than for the
larger BLU-97 reference target for the same period.
Comparing thermal anomalies from the two different reference targets, M77 visibility was patchier than that for the BLU-97.

Generally, anomaly visibility was most consistent at night. However,
other variables were at play that affected the anomaly strength other
than a twenty-four-hour diurnal cycle, weakening the apparent anomaly strength at times during some nights.
Better thermal contrast may be visible for some anomalies during
the day (e.g., BLU-97 targets in Figure 4 and Figure 7), but the operating window during the day is more limited, particularly for the M77.

Wind Gusts

Wind Gust km/h

After identifying inconsistencies in
30
28
anomaly visibility during the same time
26
slots on different nights and days, we
24
(a)
22
checked wind speed data for those times.
20
(c)
Figure 8 shows wind gust data recorded
18
16
by the weather station for the length of the
14
(b)
study. Next to labels (a)–(c) in Table 3 are
12
(d)
(e)
10
times of weak anomaly visibility for the
8
BLU-97 reference targets during the night.
6
4
The same times as Table 3 (a)–(c) have been
2
marked on the wind gust chart (Figure 8),
0
with a trend seeming to be that the visibility of the BLU-97 anomalies deteriorate
Time
as nightly wind gusts increase. Similarly,
Figure 8. Wind gust data for the four nights and three-and-a-half days on site. Note that the
times when anomaly visibility was good weather station was not calibrated to scientific standards, and so measurements should be
have been labelled as (d) and (e) in Table 3, considered relative rather than absolute.
which corresponds with times of low wind
TIR anomalies from the BLU-97 reference target show similar
gusts, marked as (d) and (e) in Figure 8. The threshold between
trends during the day, with wind gusts dropping at around 11:00–
weak and visible wind gusts in Figure 8 (b), 8 (d), and 8 (e) was
12:00 on Day 1 to Day 3, corresponding with when green boxes
when wind gusts dropped below approximately 10 kph. Other facappear near the middle of the day in Table 4. The M77 reference
tors may have contributed to anomaly visibility, and weather statarget seemed more sensitive, following similar trends, but was vistion instruments were not calibrated to scientific standards, so care
ible for less time.
must be taken if quoting absolute metrics.
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TIR Anomaly Signatures by Submunition Type
The strength and size of anomalies varied by submunition type.
Spherical targets showed smaller anomaly sizes spatially, with the
shape of each anomaly roughly corresponding with a submunition’s top surface when covered by sand. The hypothesis was that
as the target was closer to the surface, its visibly would increase.
TIR anomalies were stronger for the larger BLU-61 than the BLU63 spherical submunitions. BLU-97 and PTAB submunition TIR
anomalies were long and rectangular in shape, as they are relatively
large cylindrical targets that were buried horizontally.

Figure 9 shows examples of typical TIR anomalies at night with
photos of each submunition below to compare with the physical
properties of targets. The amount of metal in each submunition
also varies, which could affect heat storage and thermal transfer
properties. Regarding the approximate amount of metal content
found in each submunition target, (small) M42s and M77s contain
130 g (medium) BLU-63s contain 300 g, and large BLU-61s and
BLU-97s contain 700 g.

Variability in Anomaly Strength and Trends by Depth
Table 3 to Table 6 provide insight regarding the variability of
anomaly strength for the large and small submunition reference
targets during different time slots.
The TIR anomaly strength can also vary at the same time on
different days or nights. For example, anomalies from four buried

BLU-97 targets were strong at 06:00 on Night 1 (left column, Figure
10 [a]–[d]) but noticeably weaker at 06:00 on Night 4 (right column, Figure 10 [e]–[h]). The difference in TIR anomaly strength
also affected the depth at which they were visible, i.e., BLU-97 TIR
anomalies can be seen up to a depth of 2.7 cm at 06:00 on Night 1
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(Figure 10 [d]) but are clearly visible only up to a depth of 1.3 cm at
06:00 on Night 4 (Figure 10 [f]).
Graph (i) compared to (ii) in Figure 10 shows the anomaly crosssectional temperature changes that substantiate such an interpretation, where a driving force greater than 0.5 degrees Celsius was
required for an anomaly to be visible in this example.
Weather data from 06:00 on those two nights (Table 7) shows
that the air temperature and humidity were similar but there was a
noticeable difference in wind gust speed. This matches the observations in Table 3 against wind gust data in Figure 8 for (orange)
weak anomaly strengths when wind gusts increased. Figure 4 also
shows that there can be variations in how deep TIR anomalies can
be seen at different times. A BLU-97 anomaly 2.7 cm deep was

M42

M77

BLU-63

visible at 13:30 on Day 1, compared to being barely visible at 19:30
on Night 3.
Target physical properties can also affect the depth at which
TIR anomalies are visible. A BLU-61 buried at 2.8 cm (Figure 6 [h],
Figure 7 [h]) appears barely visible, compared to the larger, visible
BLU-97 buried at 2.7 cm (Figure 6 [l], Figure 7 [l]).
Generally, during favorable conditions, the deeper targets produced anomalies that seemed more dull or hazy, in some cases
spanning a larger spatial area but at a lower intensity than that of
a shallower target of the same model. For example, Figure 4 (iv)
versus (iii) and Figure 10 ( d) versus (c) show how anomalies from a
BLU-97 at 2.7 cm are duller, with responses more dispersed off to
the sides than those from a BLU-97 buried at 0.7 cm.

BLU-61

BLU-97

Figure 9. Submunition targets and example night-time anomalies from Night 3 at 23:00. Anomalies and targets are presented approximately
to scale. Burial depths for TIR anomalies above are as follow: M42: 1.0 cm, M77: 1.0 cm, BLU-63: 1.0 cm, BLU-61: 0.7 cm, BLU-97: 1.3 cm.

Image 2: Left is an image from the daylight camera taken
on Day 1 at 13:30, at the same time as Figure 7, showing that
targets are not visible to the naked eye. Five surface targets
were also placed across the top row of the grid, with both
TIR and daylight imagery captured for these surface targets
every minute during the research period. This was to learn
about TIR responses on the surface, and perhaps potential
surface imagery techniques co-registering TIR and daylight
imagery, which can be discussed in a future article.

Different Ground Composition
As mentioned, a second baseline TIR study took place during the
same mission, in hard, compacted, crystalized ground (Image 3).
The second baseline study ran for seven twenty-four-hour periods.
Data presented thus far is from ground found at a cluster munition
clearance site approximately 10 km away from the hard ground
site, where targets were buried in soft, grainy sand (Image 4). Image
3 and Image 4 illustrate how both ground types looked different
under magnification.
Using a BLU-97 buried in hard ground at a depth of 2.2 cm as
a reference target (Figure 11), 336 anomalies were ranked at thirty
minute intervals into categories of visible (green), weak (orange),
and not visible (red), just as in Tables 3–6. Table 8 and Table 9
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display a visibility summary for the BLU-97 reference target in
hard ground found near Al-Bussayah.
TIR data showed that during the day, the sandy ground produced clearer TIR anomalies for the BLU-97 reference target
compared to the same reference target buried in hard, compacted
ground. Trends were similar between sandy and hard ground for
TIR anomalies at night, where anomalies were visible most of the
time, as can be seen in Table 8.
Reviewing weather data during times when anomalies were
either weak or not visible at night in hard ground showed the same
trend as in sandy ground—that an increase in wind gusts had a
detrimental effect on TIR anomaly visibility from buried targets.

0600 Night 1–Visible

0600 Night 4–Weak

(a)

(e)

(b)

(f)

(c)

(g)

(d)

(h)

(i)

(ii)

Figure 10. A side-by-side comparison of a column of anomalies from BLU-97 targets
buried at four different depths. The left above graph is from a favorable time (green
in Table 3) at 06:00 on Night 1, compared to the same targets at a weaker time, at
06:00 on Night 4 (orange in Table 3) in the above right graph.
Targets were buried at the following depths: Figure 10(a) and (e) 2.0 cm, (b) and (f)
1.3 cm, (c) and (g) 0.7 cm, (d) and (h) 2.7 cm. Graphs (i) and (ii) below present a cross
sectional perspective of the strength of each anomaly (driving force) in degrees
Celsius. The visibility threshold in this example seems to be a driving force greater
than 0.5 degrees Celsius.
Time:
06:00

Air
Temperature

Wind Gust
(km/h)

Solar Radiation
(W/m2)

Humidity

Night 1

19.1ºC

8.6

0

63%

Night 4

19.2ºC

18.7

0

62%

Table 7. Weather data at 06:00 Night 1 and Night 4.

Discussion
We proved that thermal anomalies emitted
from buried targets not visible to the naked eye or
regular daylight cameras can be captured by TIR
cameras to indicate the location of buried submunitions in the Iraqi desert.
In order to share anomaly characterization data,
we visualized forty-two different TIR anomalies
from weathered targets buried at our baseline field
test site. Additionally, we summarized findings to
suggest optimal operating times in the Iraqi desert by analyzing 696 TIR anomalies, presenting the
summary in Tables 3–6 and in Tables 8–9. These
summaries show that TIR anomaly visibility varies by time of day and submunition model, and
indicates that buried submunition targets could be
seen for most of the night, apart from when it was
windy. Performance-affecting factors such as wind
gusts can also affect the visibility of TIR anomalies
on a day-to-day basis.
An interesting new finding was that daytime
anomalies from buried submunition targets were
visible to the TIR camera in a sandy environment
for three to four hours each day during favorable
conditions. In some cases, there was better thermal contrast in sandy ground during the day than
at night. This is encouraging because of increased
risks as well as difficulties in gaining permission to
work at night.
Although too early to predict where else a TIR
sensor may or may not be viable based on results
from soil types found in the Muthanna Province
in Iraq, anomalies were visible in two substantially different soil types. Thus, our recommendation is to test on a case-by-case basis until
proof is collected from many other locations.
A time to conduct a dedicated soil comparison
study might be when samples are collected from
baseline trials in more than ten different countries or regions.
Addressing false alarm rates and blind tests were
not within the scope of an initial controlled sensor
baseline field study. Because we used thirty-yearold weathered production targets harvested from
contaminated sites in the region instead of surrogate or simulant targets, a target legitimacy study
was not required. Moreover, because work did not
take place in a research location outside of Iraq, an
environment and meteorological legitimacy study
was not required.
A logical question from HMA field personnel is
how deep such a potential tool might work. This
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Figure 11. (Left) A TIR anomaly from the BLU-97 reference target at a depth of 2.2 cm in hard ground during a favourable time (green). This
example was captured at 22:00 on Night 2 of the hard ground study. (Right) The surface cross sectional change in temperature caused by
the TIR anomaly from the buried target.
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includes many complexities only touched upon in the results section. A dedicated baseline study is required to address that question. Further study is also required regarding whether to bury large
cylindrical submunitions such as the BLU-97 and PTAB vertically
or horizontally.
Running a second baseline field study in hard compacted ground
proved that TIR anomalies could be identified in a geophysical
environment other than just soft sand. Hard ground with a heterogenous surface is a more complex environment. It is likely to
add more challenging variables such as potential differences in heat
transfer through a crusty, compacted surface, and perhaps a potentially significant false alarm rate from competing surface objects
such as stones that may exhibit similar thermal profiles to anomalies from buried targets.
We suspect that all the factors have varying influences on the
strength and timing of thermal anomalies from buried targets seen
by the TIR camera. These include variables such as
• air temperature (and changes/rate of change throughout the
diurnal cycle)
• wind (constant speed or gusts)

depth, target orientation
sun (solar radiation), cloud
soil (composition, mineralization, particle size and characteristics, color, proportion of organic matter, and surface
characteristics)
• target (materials, surface area, shape, wall thickness, fill substance, and cavities).
Variables may also include humidity, ground moisture, terrain,
or other factors that we have not recognized yet, acting individually or on a compounded basis. A benefit of conducting a real-world
field study is that all the major variables are likely to be in play—
reducing the chance of omitting any factors that might have a significant impact on performance.
Whether TIR-equipped UAVs can add value beyond current cluster munition land release procedures is a question for the future.
The first step is documenting the real-world capabilities and limits
of the TIR sensor. This was achieved automatically by recording
data twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week from the static
mounted TIR camera at the baseline field site, a feat not possible
at such high temporal resolution when flying TIR equipped UAVs.

Image 3. An image from a microscope of a sample of the hard, compacted, crystalised ground where the second baseline TIR study
took place. You can see how particles appear as a concretion.

Image 4. An image from a microscope of sand particles taken from
the ground featured in this article. Notice how particles are quite
granular.
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Table 8. Anomaly Visibility BLU-97 2.2 cm Depth, Hard Ground, Night.
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Table 9. Anomaly Visibility BLU-97 2.2 cm Depth, Hard Ground, Day.

Conclusions
The studies in two different ground types proved that TIR
imaging can be used to locate sub-surface cluster munitions
at a controlled location in the Iraqi desert. The strength of
thermal anomalies can vary by day, indicating that generalizations cannot be made without more field data to substantiate claims. The first, second, and third priorities should be
more field data collection either at or within close proximity
to legacy contaminated areas.
We have a pathway to move forward: to get on with the
job in a practical way by gathering real-world field data to
decide if and when to operate TIR-equipped UAVs as an
enhanced HMA survey tool. There is no panacea; merits
must be judged on a case-by-case basis for different types of
contamination and each natural environment—in arid and
perhaps semi-arid locations.
Image 5. It is important to visit local CHAs and clearance
sites to understand what weathered targets and the local
environment look like. This is an in-situ, 30-year-old legacy
submunition waiting for demolition. A sample of the sandy
ground magnified under a microscope is shown in Image 4.
An image from a microscope of sand particles taken from
the ground featured in this article, and can be seen as quite
granular.
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Future Work
Our embedded field trials took place under a HMA banner,
meaning that a practical impact-driven approach needs to continue. Working with UAV daylight imagery at simple and advanced
levels will remain the core foundation for activities, expanding
across additional countries. TIR field work both complements
this and spearheads new ways of using UAV technology for HMA.
More empirical data is required such as UAV TIR data from live
CHA sites and gaining more knowledge, particularly regarding
factors such as depth limits, the influence of ground composition,
and seasonality in specific locations.
We are currently setting up more baseline TIR test sites in the
Middle East. Studies will run simultaneously with UAV mapping
using standard cameras. Studies may run for a few days (for a quick
snapshot) or several weeks (if trying to identify weather trends)
depending on budget and logistical constraints each time.
By setting up multiple baseline TIR field test sites around the
globe, the HMA community can scale up efforts to determine the
viability for TIR sensors on a more widespread basis. This can be

Image 6. NPA field staff helping to set up the baseline TIR field test
site in the desert.

achieved through projects that involve technical experts and HMA
operators collaborating together in the field.
For more information see www.mr-au.com.
See endnotes page 74
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